Culture and Personality

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1. Introduction

“I am homosapiens, I am American” (Rozin, 2003; p. 281)

Personality is shaped by both genetic and environmental factors; among the most important of the latter are cultural influences. Culture consists of shared meaning systems that provide the standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating, and acting among those who share a language, a historic period, and a geographic location (Triandis, 1996). More recently Chiu and Hong (in press) have defined culture as a network of knowledge that is both procedural (learned sequence of responses to particular cues) and declarative (representations of people, events, and norms) and is produced, distributed, and reproduced among a collection of interconnected people.

Culture is different from ethnicity in that ethnicity refers to common background or social origins, shared culture and traditions that are distinctive, maintained between generations, and result in a sense of identity and group membership, and shared language or religious tradition (Senior & Bhopal, 1994). Culture is a broader construct than ethnicity because it encompasses macro-level processes and deals specifically with the values and norms that govern and organize a group of people (e.g., capitalistic culture), defining characteristics and behaviors that are deemed appropriate or inappropriate for an organized group (e.g., American business customs). Culture also specifies the context and environment (i.e., a specific place, time, and stimuli) in which ethnicity exists. Obviously, not all individuals sharing a common ‘cultural space’ (e.g., US) have the same ethnicity (e.g., Hispanic, Asian-American, African-American). In addition, culture and ethnicity are different from race, in that race refers to shared genetic heritage, expressed by common external physical characteristics such as facial features, skin color, and hair texture (e.g., Hispanic individuals can be White such as Spaniards or Argentineans, Black such as individuals from Cuba or the Dominican Republic, or Native-American such as many Mexicans and Guatemalans).
Culture is transmitted through language, media messages, cultural practices and institutions, values and artifacts, and through the modeling of behavior (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Social scientists have recognized for decades that these influences have substantial psychological effects on individuals. However, culture does not have a deterministic influence on individuals’ behavior. Rather, its influence is probabilistic (e.g., Allport, 1961; Stryker & Burke, 2000). Rohner’s (1984) metaphor that compares culture to a game (with various rules) and people to its players clearly illustrates this point. Players can pick from different strategies and options, and sometimes even violate or modify the rules if they think they can get away with it. In other words, the degree to which players follow the rules differs across individuals, depending on their personal preferences, moods, and specific situations. This results in a great deal of within-culture heterogeneity and individual differences in the degree to which people endorse, internalize, and utilize particular rules (or norms, see Oishi, 2004 for a similar view).

Cultural influences on personhood were a prevalent concern in early personality psychology (e.g., Allport, 1961; Kluckhohn & Murray, 1948; McClelland, 1961), but, for reasons we will discuss later, largely ignored in modern personality theory and research until the early 1990s. However, many cultural studies conducted during the last decade on issues such as self-processes, emotion, and personality traits have firmly established the following: culture is a key determinant of what it means to be a person (see reviews by Church, 2000; Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Markus & Kitayama, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002).¹

In this chapter we will review (1) key theories and studies dealing with cultural differences in levels and processes for various personality constructs (e.g. emotion, traits, identity) and (2) important conceptual issues personality researchers need to consider when conducting cultural research (see Benet-Martínez, in press, for a review of cross-cultural methodological issues). With this review, we also hope to persuade personality researchers that cultural research offers exciting and interesting benefits and opportunities not available with
traditional research approaches (Matsumoto, 2000). Cultural personality studies help elucidate how macro contextual factors mediate and moderate personality outcomes (e.g., Schimmak et al., 2002), help dispel shaky cultural stereotypes (e.g., Terracciano et al., 2005), and test the generalizability of our theories (e.g., Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). Cultural studies, which often rely on multiple languages and samples, also offer personality researchers a way of dealing with classic methodological issues regarding construct validity and generalizability (e.g., need to control for possible confounding variables such as SES or language proficiency; use of multi-sample, multi-trait, multi-method designs, etc.; Benet-Martínez, in press). The cultural perspective, in fact, may make us better at ‘seeing’ personality. In other words, by understanding the cultural backdrop of a particular construct, behavior, or script, culturally-informed personality researchers may correctly see individual differences and patterns of personality consistency and coherence where other researchers would only see extraneous or random variability.

**Culture and Personality: Historical Analysis**

Most personality psychologists agree that the systematic study of how culture influences social and intra-personality behavior should be an essential part of our discipline. Yet, cultural studies continue to be somewhat underrepresented in personality psychology (compared to social psychology, for instance). Why is this? One reason may be historical. Because of the serious methodological, theoretical, and ethical limitations of some of the studies on culture and personality conducted in the first half of the 20th century, some psychologists may still view cultural work on personality with skepticism.

The field of ‘culture and personality’ (Benedict, 1934; Kardiner, 1939; Dubois, 1944) emerged in the first half of the 20th century driven mainly by psychoanalytic-oriented anthropologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists. This movement thrived in the 30s and 40s and was considered by many an exciting and influential paradigm in the social sciences. According
to recent reviews (e.g., Church & Ortiz, 2005; LeVine, 2001), the core propositions of this field were: (a) each culture has a distinctive ethos and all participants in that culture have internalized that ethos and developed a corresponding personality structure that is common to all them (the uniformity assumption); (b) childhood experiences, which are heavily culturally shaped, can be linked to predictable adult personality patterns (the continuity assumption); (c) adult personality characteristics prevalent in a nation directly impact its culture, institutions, historical and social trends, and psychopathology. Later, Sapir (1956), Wallace (1961), and others emphasized within-culture individual variations in personality and argued for the concept of ‘modal personality’ which acknowledged the existence of both central tendencies (i.e., prevalent personality types in each culture) and individual variability.2

Unfortunately, during and after WW II, ‘culture and personality’ tenets (e.g., the continuity and uniformity assumptions) and methods (e.g., projective techniques) were used to put forward the problematic notion of ‘national character,’ where whole nations such as Russia, Japan, and Germany were described in terms of a basic set of, usually negative, personality dispositions (e.g., fanaticism and restraint for the Japanese, rigidity and authoritarianism for the Germans). Because of the severe criticisms the national character studies received, the culture and personality field was stigmatized and by the 60s it had clearly ‘fell from grace.’ Although a number of personality psychologists continued to show interest in personality from a cross-cultural perspective (e.g., McClelland, 1961), by the 70s and 80s, interest on the topic had vanished.

Cultural studies in personality resurged in the 90s. Church (2001) notes some of the factors that led to this come-back: A refinement of the concept of personality and their ability to predict behavior across situations (Kenrick & Funder, 1988), the acceptance of the Five Factor Model (FFM) as an adequate taxonomy of personality differences, the emergence of individualism and collectivism (I-C) as dimension that may link ecology, culture, and personality,
the multicultural movement in the US, the refinement of statistical methodology to address cross-cultural conceptual, linguistic, and measurement equivalence issues, and lastly, the internationalization of scientific activity, which makes cross-cultural collaboration easier. Currently, the study of culture and personality is prosperous and being approached from a variety of theoretical perspectives.

2. Culture and Personality: Current Theoretical Models

Broadly speaking, current research examining the role of culture in personality and social behavior can be seen as falling within either the cultural or cross-cultural approach. These two approaches have relatively distinct conceptual, methodological, and historical elements (Greenfield, 2000), although at times the differences between these two camps have been overemphasized.

The cultural psychology view endorses relativist and constructivist notions of personality, and tends to favor emic (i.e., indigenous) over imposed-etic (i.e., imported) approaches to theory and instrument development. Specifically, it posits that personality—the affective, motivational, and cognitive dispositions that influence our evaluations and reactions to the environment—cannot be separated from the broad social and cultural context where it develops and is expressed (Markus & Kitayama, 1998; Miller, 1997). As eloquently stated by Markus and Kitayama (1998): “A cultural psychological perspective implies that there is no personality without culture; there is only a biological entity.” (p. 67; italics added). Thus, culture provides the context in which personality develops, is observed, and acquires meaning (for both the individual and the observer), and as a result, the existence of universal personality traits is questioned. In his recent review of the cultural and cross-cultural traditions, Church (2001) notes that the cultural approach is often characterized by: (a) a concern with psychological processes (vs. individual differences); (b) a focus on highly-contextual descriptions of psychological phenomenon in one or more cultures, with little expectations of finding cultural universals; and
(c) an emphasis on experimental methodology, coupled with qualitative or interpretive approaches (Church, 2001). Most studies examining cultural influences on self-processes (e.g., self-enhancement, self-concept) and social behavior (e.g., attribution, dissonance, etc.) fit within the cultural perspective. Cultural psychology also speaks to the socially constructed nature of the construct of personality (e.g., how the notions of traits and personality consistency are particularly meaningful in the West).

The cross-cultural approach, on the other hand, treats culture and personality as relatively distinct entities and sees culture as an independent variable "outside" the individual (e.g., ecology, economic structure, value system) that influences personality and behavior (Triandis, 1996). Implicit in the cross-cultural approach is an ecocultural model with a causal sequence from ecology (e.g., the physical environment) to culture to socialization patterns (e.g., child-rearing practices) to personality (Triandis & Suh, 2002). Church (2001) notes that the cross-cultural approach is characterized by (a) a focus on individual differences such as in values, beliefs, etc. but particularly personality traits; (b) comparisons of multiple cultures in the search for cultural universals, or culture-specifics along with universals; (c) use of traditional, standardized psychometric questionnaires to measure both personality and culture; and (d) concern with the cross-cultural equivalence of constructs and measures. The majority of studies examining cultural influences on personality traits fit within the cross-cultural perspective.

A key differentiation within the cross-cultural approach is the distinction between the genotypic and phenotypic views, which have quite diverging stands about the meaning of personality traits and their cultural and biological basis. The genotypic view (McCrae, 2000; McCrae & Costa, 1996) views personality traits as endogenous and inherited basic tendencies that are largely independent from culture. In this approach, McCrae and Costa distinguish between ‘basic tendencies’ --inherited, biologically-based traits captured by their Five Factor Model and ‘characteristic adaptations’ --habits, values, beliefs, goals, and identities, which
develop from the interaction of basic tendencies and experience. Note that in this model only characteristic adaptations can be culturally shaped; thus, dispositions to be anxious, talkative, creative, accommodating, or disciplined (i.e., FFM traits) are culture-free. Two conclusions derive from this model: First, because basic personality tendencies (i.e., FFM traits) are biologically-based, they should be universal; second, cultural differences on FFM levels should be taken as indicative of genetic differences between the cultural groups under study. Notice that this model also implies that responses to instruments such as the NEO reflect one’s standing on the basic, biologically-based tendencies, rather than characteristic adaptations.

Proponents of phenotypic view (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996), on the other hand, conceptualize personality traits as observable behavioral regularities that reflect both genetic dispositions and characteristic adaptations to the socio-cultural context. This view emphasizes the socio-cognitive and linguistic basis of personality traits. It posits that lexically-derived personality taxonomies such as the FFM or Big Five reflect dispositions that have been encoded in the language because they represent attributes that are particularly significant for the society speaking that language. This approach views culture as an independent variable that may impact the level, expression, and correlates of traits and the underlying structure or dimensions of personality. According to this model then, the basic personality constructs captured in personality taxonomies as well as individuals’ responses to most trait inventories reflect observable (i.e., phenotypic) expressions, and thus no a-priori assumptions about their genetic vs. cultural basis can be made (only behavioral genetic studies can answer the last issue).

Recently, the boundaries between cultural and cross-cultural approaches are becoming less significant as the old debates between social and personality psychology about the meaning and status of the construct of personality finally die out, as new generations of cultural researchers are trained in multiple methods (psychometric, experimental, and interpretive methods), as the processes by which culture influences behavior become better understood, and
as new data analytic techniques (e.g., multi-group latent class analysis and multi-level analysis) become more readily available. Indeed, there are new models of culture and personality that attempt to integrate the cultural with cross-cultural perspectives. For instance, Church (2000) theorized that (a) traits exist in all cultures, but explain behavior less in collectivist than in individualist cultures, (b) situational predictors of behavior are important universally, but more so in collectivist than in individualist cultures, and (c) cognitive and behavioral consistency exists universally, but is less important in collectivist than in individualist cultures. Many empirical studies are also starting to combine features from both approaches, focusing on individual differences while supporting a view of culture and personality as mutually constituted, acknowledging bidirectional effects between culture and personality, and combining emic and imposed-etic methodology (e.g., Aaker, Benet-Martínez, & Garolera, 2000; Benet-Martínez, 1999; Benet-Martínez & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2003; Oishi & Diener, 2001). These approaches see personality variables (e.g., self- and other-ascribed traits, self-concept, well-being, goals) as often inseparable from cultural processes in that the ways that situations are framed and experienced and the factors a person brings to a situation (e.g., expectations, values, etc.) are cultural products themselves.

3. Traits and Culture

Are there cultural differences in personality traits such as extraversion or emotional stability? This is often the type of question that comes to mind when thinking about the issue of cultural influences in personality. However, as our chapter attests, personality traits are only one of the several types of personality constructs and processes influenced by cultural forces. Further, answering questions regarding possible cultural differences in personality traits requires first addressing more basic questions regarding the cross-cultural status of (1) the very notion of traits and traitedness (i.e., behavioral consistency), (2) the dimensional structures identified to
organize trait variance (e.g., the FFM), and (3) the specific meanings and behaviors associated to broad and narrow personality traits (e.g., extraversion, assertiveness).

Some cultural psychologists have argued that the very notion of personality traits implies a belief in behavioral individuality, situational consistency, and temporal stability that is culture-specific (Markus & Kitayama, 1998). An impressive program of research on this issue by Church and his colleagues (e.g., Church et al., 2003; 2006) provides some answers. For instance, in a large scale study that included two individualistic cultures (US and Australia) and four collectivistic cultures (Mexico, Philippines, Malaysia, and Japan), Church and his colleagues (Church et al., 2006) found that implicit trait beliefs are endorsed in all cultural groups, although these beliefs are stronger in individualistic cultures. Further, across the six cultures, trait beliefs seemed to be endorsed as much or more than contextual beliefs. Self-perceptions of one’s own level of traitedness (i.e., behavioral consistency) seem to be more culturally-dependent however, and were lower in the collectivistic countries (except for Mexico).

The issue of whether the Big Five personality trait dimensions are cross-culturally robust and whether different, fewer, or more personality dimensions are needed in some cultures depends on the approach (imposed-etic or emic) taken to explore this issue. A comprehensive review of the many cross-cultural studies relying on translated versions of well-established personality questionnaire --i.e., imposed-etic personality studies-- goes beyond the scope of this chapter (see Church & Ortiz, 2006; or Triandis & Suh, 2002; for excellent reviews), so we will only summarize key studies and findings. Studies using translations of Anglo-based Big Five measures have reliably replicated the same five-factor structure across many different cultures and languages (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Additional support for the cross-cultural robustness of the Big Five dimensions comes from cross-cultural studies using translated versions of personality scales that do not measure the Big Five per se, such as the Personality Research Form and the Nonverbal Personality Questionnaire (Paunonen & Ashton, 1998). Additionally, self-
and peer-ratings of the NEO-PI-R seem to converge in other cultures as much as they do in American samples (Smith et al., 2006), and the same five factors emerge when the factor analyses are done at the nation-level (Allik & McCrae, 2004). Lastly, Big Five scores correlate with various criteria (e.g., self- and relational-esteem, self-construals, life satisfaction) quite consistently in Western and Asian samples (Benet-Martinez & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2003; Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997). In conclusion, the cross-cultural evidence for the stability of the Anglo-based Big Five across cultures and languages is very impressive. This means that researchers can confidently and reliably measure these five personality dispositions (as defined in the Anglo-Saxon world) in other cultures. However, the psychometric applicability of the Anglo Big Five measures in other cultures does not speak of the validity of the Big Five to capture the local meaning and structure of personality traits in other cultures (see previous discussion of this issue in page X). In fact, it should be noted that translated versions of instruments tapping personality models different from the Big Five (e.g., The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Eysenck Personality Inventory, California Psychological Inventory, Big Seven model, etc) also replicate quite well cross-culturally (Church, 2000; Smith et al., 2006). Only studies relying on emic or combined etic-emic approaches can directly address the issue of which personality dimensions are more robust cross-culturally (i.e., universal).

A comprehensive review of all the emic personality studies conducted in other languages and cultures also goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Saucier and Goldberg (2001) carefully organized and meticulously compared lexical personality studies conducted in English and 12 other languages and concluded that, with the exception of Openness to Experience, most of these studies identified variants of four of the five factors (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness). Most emic studies that found more than five factors included additional dimensions representing culture-specific forms of Extraversion or...
Agreeableness subcomponents (e.g., face, interpersonal harmony, social reciprocity) or dimensions denoting social evaluation with regard to power, morality, or attractiveness. Saucier and Goldberg (2001) also conclude that the Anglo-based Big Five model replicates most predictably in emic personality studies when all of the following conditions are present: (a) the culture is of Northern European origin, (b) the personality descriptor pool contains only terms denoting trait dispositions (i.e., excludes evaluative terms), and (c) the factor analyses are done on ipsatized self-ratings.

In sum, even though the Anglo-based Big-Five structure is incompletely supported by some emic studies, dimensions resembling (i.e., cultural variants of) Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism appear in most of these studies. All in all, these findings suggest that, while Openness to Experience may be a personality dimension unique to Anglo-based cultures, the other four dimensions have both universal and culture-specific components. Note that these results would seem to validate the phenotypic view of personality which views taxonomic personality dimensions as reflecting both genetic dispositions and characteristic adaptations to the socio-cultural context.

A neglected issue in the literature is the question of whether indigenous personality constructs have better predictive power than the Anglo-based Big Five traits. Katigbak and colleagues (Katigbak et al., 2002) found that Filipino indigenous inventories added modest incremental validity beyond the FFM in predicting common health, risk-related, and religious behaviors (i.e., smoking, drinking, gambling, accident proneness, and praying). Bond (2000), however, reports several studies with Chinese where indigenous dimensions predicted specific culture-bound behaviors such as filial piety or gentle persuasion well beyond the FFM. It should be noted that the use of both imported and indigenous personality scales (i.e., a combined emic-etic approach) is ideal in exploratory lexical and validational studies, however this design may prove too expensive and lengthy in cultural studies simply interested in examining the link
between personality and specific behavioral outcomes. As a compromising solution, Benet-Martinez and John (2000) have proposed the use of *quasi-indigenous* personality dimensions. This approach involves first identifying psychometrically a manageable set of indigenous personality descriptors that reliably measure the Big Five using local, culturally relevant terms, and then using these quasi-indigenous Big Five dimensions to predict the outcomes of interest.

Finally, recent research by McCrae and colleagues (Allik & McCrae, 2004; McCrae, Terraciano, et al., 2005) reports country-level scores on the FFM for 51 different cultures. The standing of particular countries on the Big Five traits was summarized in Table 2 in McCrae, Terraciano et al., 2005; or Figures 1 and 2 in Allik & McCrae, 2004). These studies also report meaningful correlations between nation-level scores on the Big Five personality traits and nation-level scores on cultural values (individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance) and socio-economic indicators (e.g., GDP). These later results are particularly useful in that they provide a theoretical basis for interpreting the country-level mean personality differences. More recently, the research by this research group (Terraciano et al., 2005) has shed light over an important issue with profound social implications: the accuracy of cultural (self)stereotypes regarding personality (e.g., “the somber Scandinavian” or the “hot-tempered Mediterranean”). Almost four thousand respondents in 49 cultures were asked to describe the personality of typical member of their own culture, and these scores were then compared with the actual personality scores of culture members (as assessed by self- and observer-ratings). Results indicated that people’s perceptions of the ‘stereotypical personality’ of their own native culture are very consistent but do not reflect individuals’ actual personality traits.

### 4. Affect and Culture

The patterns of feeling, along with thinking and behaving, are signatures of one’s personality (McRae & Costa, 1999). As in the research on personality traits, the first step for
cross-cultural research in this area was to examine the degree of cross-cultural invariance in structure. Russell (1983) used similarity judgments and multidimensional scaling and found that Chinese, Japanese, Croatian, and Gujarati’s similarity judgments resulted in the circular structure of moods (pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness dimensions) similar to Canadians. Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1984) conducted one of the first daily diary studies in Japan, and investigated cross-cultural comparability in within-person structure of moods. It was also one of the longest daily diary studies to date (90 days!). Watson and colleagues obtained the two-factor structure (positive and negative mood factors) and factor loadings similar to the one previously found among Americans. The only major difference was concerned with the term “sleepy” (or *nemui*). In the U.S., sleepy had a negative loading to the positive mood factor, whereas in Japan it did not load on the positive factor. This suggests that Americans were *not* sleepy when they were feeling positive moods, whereas Japanese were feeling sleepy some times when they were in positive moods. These differences might have come from cultural differences in general preference for high activation versus low activation positive moods: Americans typically prefer high activation positive mood (e.g., excited) to low activation positive mood (e.g., calm), whereas East Asians value low activation positive mood as much as high activation positive mood (Tsai, Knuston, & Fung, 2006). Individuals who value the experience of high activation positive mood are likely to devalue that of low activation mood such as sleepy.

Whereas Russell (1983) and Watson et al. (1984) found remarkable similarities in the structure of affect across cultures, recent research found systematic cultural variations as well. For instance, using the experience sampling method, Scollon, Diener, Oishi, and Biswas-Diener (2005) found that the factor loading of pride was quite different across cultures. Whereas pride loaded on the positive mood factor only among European Americans and Hispanic Americans, pride loaded on both positive and negative moods among Asian Americans, Japanese, and Indians (see also Oishi, in press, in difference between Americans and Chinese on pride using...
Item Response Theory). Likewise, Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (2000) found that general happiness was strongly associated with interpersonally disengaging positive emotions (e.g., pride) among Americans, whereas it was strongly associated with interpersonally engaging positive emotions (e.g., *fureai*) among Japanese. The notable cultural difference involving pride observed above is also consistent with the cross-cultural literature on self-esteem and self-enhancement (Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, in press).

Besides the structural issues, researchers investigated facial recognition and appraisal dimensions of emotions across cultures for decades. For instance, Ekman and colleagues (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1987) showed that people from one culture can recognize emotion expressed by members of another culture with a great deal of accuracy (see also Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Following Darwin (1872/1965), Ekman and colleagues argued that facial expression and recognition are biologically determined and therefore universal. It should be noted, however, that there were also some cultural differences in Ekman et al.’s study. For instance, only 60 to 67% of Japanese participants correctly recognized disgust, fear and anger, in comparison to 81 to 86% of American participants (see also Russell, 1994). These lower accuracy among Japanese might be due to their tendency to project the perspective of generalized others to the presented face (e.g., seeing “fear” in an “angry” face, Cohen & Gunz, 2002).

Whereas the majority of facial recognition studies used a single face representing a single emotion, Masuda and colleagues (2006) devised the paradigm in which the focal face was presented with multiple other faces in the background. Given that our facial recognition in daily life takes place with the presence of other individuals, this paradigm has a greater degree of ecological validity than the still pictures often used in this literature. Using this new paradigm, these researchers showed that Japanese participants’ facial recognition was affected by surrounding faces to a greater extent than Americans’. Using an eye track method, these
researchers further demonstrated that this cultural difference was explained by perceptual attention given to the focal versus non-focal objects in the visual field: Japanese gaze moved back and forth between the focal and background faces, whereas American gaze fixated at the focal face very quickly. These results indicate that, whereas there are a great deal of cultural similarities in facial recognition outcomes (final categorization), there are cultural differences in facial recognition processes.

In terms of appraisal dimensions, the majority of studies found more cross-cultural similarities than differences (see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992 for review). For example, Mauro, Sato, and Tucker (1992) found that the relevance of “primitive” dimensions such as pleasantness, attentional activity, certainty, coping potential, and goal/need conduciveness to 14 emotions was very similar in the U.S., Japan, China, and Hong Kong. In contrast, the relevance of “complex” dimensions such as control, responsibility, and anticipated effort were quite different across cultures. Scherer (1997) also report the findings from 37 countries, showing that the relevance of 8 appraisal dimensions for 7 emotions was largely similar across cultures. One notable exception was the immorality dimension for disgust. Whereas the experience of disgust was strongly associated with immorality in the U.S., New Zealand and Australia, it was unrelated in Latin American countries.

Although there is a remarkable degree of comparability across cultures in the structure, facial recognition, and appraisal of emotions, there are many other aspects of affect that differ across cultures. One of the most fundamental differences lies in labeling of feeling states. Russell (1991) reviewed this literature, and identified cultures that do not have the corresponding words for the so-called basic emotions. For instance, there is no word for disgust in Polish, Ifaluk, and Chewong. There is no word for sadness in Tahitian and Chewong, no word for fear in Ifaluk, Utku, and Pintupi, and no word for surprise in Fore, Dani, Malay, and Ifaluk. Even when there is the corresponding word, the conceptual comparability does not always exist. For example, there
is a great deal of agreement that the most appropriate Japanese translation of depression is *yuutsu*, and clearly there is a phenomenon labeled as “depression” in Japan. Yet, Tanaka-Matsumi and Marsella (1976) found that the free associations given by English speakers were very different from those given by Japanese speakers, suggesting observable symptoms of depressions as well as how it feels to be “depressed” are different between Japanese and Americans. Because labeling is an important aspect of conscious awareness of feeling state, these linguistic differences should result in predictable cultural differences in the frequency and intensity of these emotions. In addition, connotative differences of emotions might give rise to different co-occurrence patterns of emotions across cultures.

There are also well-replicated cultural differences in the desirability of various emotions. Diener, Suh, Smith, and Shao (1995) found that Americans viewed the experience and expression of positive emotions more desirable and appropriate than Chinese. Using latent class analysis, Eid and Diener (2001) also identified a culture-specific “class” among Chinese, who viewed positive emotions as neither desirable nor undesirable. This class did not exist among Americans, Australians, and Taiwanese. A more recent study showed that people in Latin America value positive emotion and devalue negative emotion, even more than North Americans (Diener, Scollon, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Suh, 2000). Thus, the largest cultural difference in desirability of emotions lies not between East Asians and North Americans, but between East Asians and Latin Americans. It is also interesting that the frequency in which people are feeling any emotion is different across cultures. Using an experience sampling method, Mesquita and Karasawa (2002) found that Japanese reported feeling “no emotion” more often than did Americans. If emotions are not experienced as often, it is then not surprising that the frequency of emotion itself is not as strong a predictor of life satisfaction in collectivist nations as in individualist nations (Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). These findings suggest that
desirability of emotion differ systematically across cultures, and these differences influence the role emotions play in people’s daily life.

The aforementioned section focused on affective experiences. Next, we will review cross-cultural research on affective traits. Many personality researchers theorize extraversion and neuroticism as affective traits. Watson and Clark (1997), for instance, argue that divergent facets of extraversion (e.g., sensation seeking, dominance, sociability) could be glued by the latent construct of positive affectivity. Lucas and colleagues (2000) tested this idea across cultures, and found that the correlation between PA and extraversion was significant in all 39 countries. Schimmack and colleagues (2002) further demonstrated that the latent link between extraversion and hedonic balance (PA – NA) was positive, and the link between neuroticism and hedonic balance was negative in the U.S., Germany, Mexico, Japan, and Ghana. Interestingly, however, they found that the latent association between hedonic balance and life satisfaction was larger among Americans and Germans than among Mexicans, Japanese, and Ghanaians.

Some cultural psychologists (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1998; Shweder, 1991) questioned whether the factor analytic results were really evidence for the existence of traits, arguing that the factor structure tells us more about semantic associations between items than behavioral co-occurrence. Cross-situational consistency provides a stronger piece of evidence than factor analysis for the existence of traits. To this end, Oishi, Diener, Scollon, and Biswas-Diener (2004) examined cross-situational consistency of affective experiences across cultures, using an experience sampling method. Replicating Diener and Larsen’s (1984) earlier findings in the U.S., Oishi and colleagues found a great deal of cross-cultural similarities in cross-situational consistency of affect at the between-person level in India, Japan, Fresno, California with Hispanic Americans and Champaign, Illinois ($r = .52$ for positive affect [e.g., happy persons alone were happier with friends], and $.51$ for negative affect). Simultaneously, however, they discovered substantial cultural differences in the degree to which specific interpersonal contexts
influenced their moods. For instance, Japanese moods varied more greatly between alone situations and with-friend situations than Americans. Based on these findings, Oishi and colleague theorized that inter-individual differences in affective experiences (e.g., Who is happy? Who is sad?) are determined largely by individuals’ temperaments and biological constituents (see Ando et al., 2002; Yamagata et al., 2006), whereas within-individual variation in affective experiences (e.g., when one feels happy or sad?) are carved out by cultural factors. In other words, the mean levels of affect are thought to be influenced largely by genetic and biological factors, whereas the if-then patterns of affect (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) are thought to be influenced largely by cultural factors.

5. Culture, Thinking, and Behaving

Along with the patterns of feeling, patterns of thinking and action are integral to the definition of personality (McRae & Costa, 1999). Thinking style also plays an important role in well-being, as internal attribution of a negative event (Peterson & Seligman, 1984) and rumination (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993) are linked to depression, while optimism is associated with self-esteem and life satisfaction (Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996). A number of studies showed that North Americans are more optimistic than East Asians (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995). Nisbett and his colleagues have identified several important cultural differences on thinking styles between North Americans and East Asians (Nisbett, 2004 for review). Confucian thinking common in East Asia tolerates contradiction, whereas the Western tradition, starting with Greek philosophy, is sensitive to contradiction. Confucian thinking is also known to be holistic and dialectic (e.g., paying attention to the whole), whereas Western thinking is known to be analytic (e.g., abstracting the essence). These different thinking styles have a profound implication for the way individuals evaluate their emotional experiences and themselves. Consistent with this idea, for instance, Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2002) found that the relation between the frequency of positive emotions and negative emotions was significantly
more negative among North Americans and Western Europeans than among East Asians. In other words, in traditionally Confucian nations, the experience of positive and negative emotions was more independent in Western nations with the tradition of analytic thinking. Likewise, Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, and Hou (2004) found that East Asians endorsed both positive and negative aspects of the self, whereas European Americans endorsed either positive or negative aspects of the self. Furthermore, this cultural group difference was mediated by dialectic thinking style scores, indicating that dialectic thinking style explains between-culture differences and within-culture individual differences (analytic East Asians endorse either positive or negative self-statements, whereas dialectic European Americans endorse both positive and negative self-statements). In addition, Koo and Choi (2005) showed that holistic thinking is learned through education. Students of Oriental medicine were more holistic than students in other disciplines, and older students in Oriental medicine were more holistic than younger students in Oriental medicine. Besides the distinction between holistic and analytic styles, Kim (2002) found an interesting cultural difference in the role of speaking in thinking: Speaking helps North Americans think well, whereas it hinders East Asians’ thinking. These findings suggest that cultural heritages affect how individuals think about themselves and others.

Levine, Norenzayan, and Philbrick (2001) conducted one of the few cross-cultural studies on behaviors, and found that people living in Brazil, Costa Rica and other Latin countries (cultures of simpatica) showed a greater degree of helping behaviors toward a stranger (the confederate) than people in other countries. Investigating the U.S. Southern culture of honor, Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz (1996) found that Southerners have a greater propensity to show physical aggression than Northerners in reaction to an insult. Southern laws were also more tolerance for violence when their honor was damaged than Northern laws (Cohen, 1996). Furthermore, Southern companies were more receptive to a fake applicant who had the violent past in reaction to the honor violation than were Northern companies (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997).
These findings provide evidence that culture provides an important context in which personality traits such as empathy and aggression are expressed.

**6. Self-Concept and Culture**

In McRae and Costa’s (1999) schematic model of personality, self-concepts are the conscious aspects of personality that reflect not only temperaments but also characteristic patterns of adaptation. Given that characteristic adaptations are influenced by culture, it is expected that the way individuals view themselves are, at least in part, culturally constructed. The content analysis of free self-descriptions revealed systematic cultural differences. For instance, Cousins (1989) found that in the typical 20-statement test, Americans used personality traits more often than did Japanese. Interestingly, however, when specific contexts were given (e.g., at home), Japanese used personality traits as frequently as Americans. Thus, it is not that Japanese do not use personality traits in self-descriptions. Rather, Japanese use of personality traits in self-descriptions is much more context specific (see Kanazawa, Cross, & Markus, 2002, as well).

There is a large body of literature on self-esteem. In a recent international study, Schimmit and Allik (2005) found that (a) the mean self-esteem score was above neutral in all 53 nations, but (b) East Asian nations scored lower than the rest (especially Japanese who scored the lowest). There is some evidence for an acculturation effect on self-esteem. For example, Japanese born and raised in Canada reported higher self-esteem than Japanese who grew up in Japan but currently living in Canada (Heine & Lehman, 2004, see similar acculturation findings on extraversion by McRae et al., 1998). Moreover, Japanese currently living in Canada reported higher self-esteem than Japanese living in Japan. In an extensive meta-analysis, Twenge and Crocker (2002) showed that Asian Americans also report lower self-esteem than European Americans. Interestingly, however, Asian Americans had slightly higher self-esteem than European Americans in the elementary school samples. Yet, the advantage of Asian Americans
no longer exist in middle school samples. In high school samples, European Americans report higher self-esteem than Asian Americans. Finally, in college samples, the difference is even larger. This meta-analysis, therefore, sheds light on developmental shift in the degree of cultural differences in self-esteem.

Although self-esteem measured by explicit scales (e.g., Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) showed considerable mean differences between North Americans and Japanese, self-esteem measure by implicit methods such as name letter preference (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997) and implicit association test (Kobayashi & Greenwald, 2003) often yielded no cultural differences. This suggests that cultural differences in explicit self-esteem might be due to cultural differences in desirability of pride and self-esteem. Namely, there is the possibility that Japanese and other East Asians report lower levels of explicit self-esteem than North Americans because of modesty (Kurman, 2003). Indeed, Akimoto and Sanbonmatsu (1999) designed a clever experiment with the public versus private self-evaluation condition, and demonstrated that Japanese Americans evaluated their task performance less positively than European Americans only in the public condition. However, other findings cannot be explained by the modesty account. Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkit (1997), for instance, found that Japanese listed more negative self-descriptions than Americans across various anonymous conditions. False feedback studies also repeatedly found that Japanese more readily accept negative feedback than positive (Heine, Lehman, & Takata, 2000). In addition, Japanese reported that proud and embarrassing events felt equally far away, whereas North Americans reported that proud event felt closer in time than the embarrassing event in anonymous open-ended self-description task (Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori, 2005). In short, although there is a great deal of agreement on the sizable East-West difference in explicit measures of self-esteem, the consensus has not yet emerged on why the magnitude of cultural difference on implicit measures of self-esteem is much smaller than that of explicit self-esteem.
Similar to the explicit self-esteem findings, many cross-cultural studies found that East Asians show less self-enhancement than European Americans (see Heine et al., in press, for a comprehensive meta-analysis). For instance, whereas “better-than average” effect is powerful among North Americans (College Board, 1976-1977), Japanese did not show the “better-than-average” effect (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Recently, Sedikides, Gaertner, and Toguchi (2003) found that Japanese participants reported having collectivist traits more than the average other, suggesting that people universally self-enhance on the traits that are personally and culturally important to them (see also Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005). These results, however, directly contradict with Heine and Reinshaw’s (2002) findings that Japanese showed more self-effacement on personally important traits. Because the self-enhancement studies using the average or typical others as a reference group have serious methodological problems (for one thing, it is impossible to disentangle their self-view and the view of “average other,” see Kenny, 1994), it is difficult to discern how much participants’ self-reports are distorted. Thus, it is critical in the future to control for raters’ bias via the social relations analysis (Kenny, 1994; Kwan et al. 2004) and other methods in cultural research on self-enhancement (see Su & Oishi, 2006 for an example).

Finally, several researchers have identified notable cultural differences in self-concept clarity and consistency. For example, Canadians reported having a clearer sense of who they are than Japanese (Campbell et al., 1996). In addition, Koreans’ self-evaluation changed to a larger extent than Americans’, depending on the question asked (e.g., how “extraverted” versus how “introverted” are you? Choi & Choi, 2002). In a related vein, Suh (2002) showed that Americans’ self-descriptions are more consistent across different roles than Koreans. Moreover, replicating Donahue et al. (1993), self-concept consistency was positively associated with well-being among European Americans. Furthermore, consistent persons were better liked by their peers among Americans. However, it was not associated with well-being among Koreans or
likability ratings by their peers. Suh’s findings are relevant to the most fundamental question about personality, namely whether “persona” is a mask (the role one plays) or the actor him or herself. Allport (1937) persuasively argued that personality should be the actor, or the true self. We agree with Allport’s argument in general that the actor’s unique way of adjusting to the environment should be a main target of personality research. Yet, Suh’s findings illuminate that (a) role expectations are stronger in Korea than in the U.S., (b) the degree to which the actor can exert an influence on the script is more restricted in Korea than in the U.S, and (c) therefore, the opportunities to observe the expression of personality might be limited and the link between personality and behavior might be weaker in Korea than in the U.S.

7. Values, Motivation, and Culture

In empirical personality research, traits have been of central focus. Yet values and other related motivational constructs are just as important in understanding human personality. Vernon and Allport (1931), for instance, maintained that values are at the core of one’s philosophy of life and provide a picture into the “total personality” (p. 231). Allport (1937, 1961) later argued that personality traits can be construed as the fully developed version of one’s biological, natural tendencies, or temperaments, whereas values reflect not only individuals’ innate preferences, but also ideal life styles. In order to understand how an individual uniquely adjusts to her environment (an important part of Allport’s definition of personality), personality researchers need to understand not only one’s typical behavioral tendencies, but also a unified philosophy of life.

Kluckhohn and Strodtebeck (1961) developed a value scale, consisting of five dimensions deemed important in the anthropological literature: man-nature orientation, time orientation, activity orientation, relational orientation, and nature of man, using a scenario method. Using this scale, they conducted one of the first cross-cultural studies on values and found that Navaho preferred the present time orientation to the past or future time orientation and the harmony with
nature to mastery, compared to Mormons, Texans, and Spanish Americans. Although these earlier efforts to measure values produced interesting findings, there was a great deal of concern about the comprehensiveness of earlier value scales. Rokeach (1973) developed his widely used value scale to address this limitation. He measured 18 instrumental values and 18 terminal values, using the ranking method. Shalom Schwartz and colleagues (e.g., Schwarz & Sagiv, 1995) extended the 36-item Rokeach Value Survey and developed a 54-item value survey, using a Likert scale. Schwartz and colleagues conducted a series of large-scale cross-cultural study of values, and validated the hierarchical structure of values.

Along with Hofstede (1980)’s work on individualism-collectivism, Ronald Inglehart’s World Value Surveys (WVS) should be recognized as one of the most important contributions to culture and value research to date. Inglehart and colleagues collected data on various values from all over the world using a nationally representative sampling method in 1981-1982, 1990-1991, and 1995-1998. Their value items resulted in two major factors: self-expression versus survival orientations and tradition versus secular-rational orientations. Consistent with Hofstede’s results, English speaking and protestant European nations were high on self-expression (similar to individualism), whereas former communist nations, African nations, and South Asian nations were low on this dimension. In contrast, protestant European nations, ex-communist nations, and Japan were very high on secularism, whereas the U.S. was quite low on secularism, replicating well-known differences between the U.S. and Western Europe in religiosity and church attendance. Most interestingly, although Japanese responses in 1995 were more individualistic (high on self-expression) than in 1981, so were other nations (e.g., the U.S., Australia). Thus, the magnitude of cultural differences between Japan and other Western developed nations in 1995 was surprisingly similar to that of in 1981 (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). These results have a great implication for the effect of globalization and westernization on value orientations. Although many naïve observers of culture often assume that many developing nations will be Westernized
and that globalization will quickly homogenize value orientations over time. So far, the WVS data suggest that globalization has not wiped out historical differences. Value orientations do change over time (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). However, change in value orientations seems to take place slowly over time. It seems fair to say that the cultural force for continuity seems to be more powerful than previously believed.

Despite these important discoveries in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the landscape of culture and value research has shifted drastically from exuberant optimism to pessimism with the publication of Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier’s (2002) meta-analysis. Oyserman and colleagues concluded that cultural differences in individualism and collectivism “were neither as large nor as systematic as often perceived” (p. 40). The main criticism of these researchers was that Hofstede’s (1980) results were not replicated when various kinds of individualism-collectivism scales were used. Indeed, according to their meta-analysis, Americans were slightly higher on collectivism than Japanese (see also Takano & Osaka, 1999 for an earlier critique on the Japan-US comparisons). It should be noted, however, that most studies reviewed by Oyserman et al. and Takano and Osaka were conducted in the 1980’s and the 1990’s and used raw means on a Likert scale. Unlike earlier cross-cultural studies (e.g., Klukhohn & Stordtbeck, 1961), therefore, these studies were susceptible to response styles. Indeed, when Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005) statistically controlled for response styles (i.e., partialing out the mean of all value items), Hofstede’s (1980) results converged quite well with Oyserman et al.’s meta analysis ($r = .50$, $p < .01$, as opposed to $r = .17$, n.s. without controlling for response styles). Namely, nations deemed individualist in Hofstede (1980) indeed scored high on individualism in Oyserman et al.’s meta-analysis as well, once response styles were statistically controlled. These findings underscore the importance of addressing response style issues in cross-cultural research (see also, Bond, 1988; Oishi, Hahn, Schimmack, Radhakrishan, Dzokoto, & Ahadi, 2005 for other solutions).
In short, although culture and value research is currently in crisis, this should not prevent cross-cultural researchers from investigating this important topic. Chinese translation of “crisis” consists of two characters: 危機. The first character means “danger,” but the second character means “opportunity.” In the spirit of the Chinese interpretation, therefore, despite the current crisis, we believe that there is a great opportunity left for cross-cultural research on values, now that the problems with previous research are clearly understood, and that the simple solutions are provided. With the use of multiple methods, future research on culture and value is likely to generate important knowledge about the “total personality” across cultures, and should continue to be integral part of culture and personality research.

Besides explicit values, personality researchers have been interested in implicit motives since Murray (1938). McClelland (1961) was a pioneer on applying his research on need for achievement to cross-cultural arena. McClelland used creative methodologies to measure need for achievement, ranging from content coding of folklores, children’s stories and literatures to vase designs, in various cultures over historical periods. For instance, he found the positive correlation between achievement imageries in folk tales and the level of entrepreneurial activity in over 40 small-scale societies (e.g., Yoruba, Masai, Apache, Navaho). In addition, McClelland showed that need for achievement seen in children’s readers in 1925 predicted economic growth in 1950 among modern societies (e.g., Sweden, U.S., Mexico, Russia). McClelland’s cross-cultural research preceded the renewed interest in culture among leading economists and political scientists today (Harrison & Huntington, 2000) by 40 years.

Whereas the leading comparative economists and political scientists focus on stable values of various nations (Lipset & Lenz, 2000), McClelland (1961) was deeply interested in within-culture changes in motives, as well. Most impressive, he demonstrated that the economic spur of Ancient Greece, 16th century Spain, and 18th century England was preceded by high levels of need for achievement seen in their respective literature. Furthermore, a subsequent
decline in each culture was also predicted by lower need for achievement seen during the rapid economic growth. These historical analyses reveal that (a) dominant motives change over time within the same society, and (b) these changes are associated with systematic changes in economic activities later in time. In short, McClelland’s work demonstrates that need for achievement is not a stable “national character,” but instead a dynamic motive that changes over time, depending on local and historic contexts. What seems like cultural differences in national character at any given time may simply be different phases of the same cycle. Whereas the cross-societal comparisons might evoke the “national character” and the notion of “cultural developmentalism,” the cross-temporal comparisons clearly demonstrates that McClelland’s work goes well beyond the traditional critique of “national character” and “cultural developmentalism.” Although David McClelland is not known for his cross-cultural work, his contribution to the culture and personality literature is worthy of the fullest recognition.

8. Culture and Psychopathology

There is a venerable research tradition on psychopathology in anthropology (e.g., La Barre, 1947). Kleinman (1977) revitalized this research topic by creating an interdisciplinary research area entitled “new cross-cultural psychiatry,” later developed into the journal *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry*. In cross-cultural psychiatry, researchers have tackled culture-specific illness, such as *taijin kyofu sho* in Japan (an extreme form of interpersonal anxiety), *ataque de nervios* among Latinos from the Caribbean (a form of anxiety and mood disorder whose symptoms include trembling and uncontrollable crying and verbal/physical aggression), and *anorexia nervosa* in the U.S., as well as epidemiological issues such as prevalence and diagnosis across cultures (see Draguns & Tanaka-Matsumi, 2003; Lopez & Guarnaccia, 2000 for reviews).

In recent years there has been a concerted effort to create culturally sensitive diagnostic criteria such as DSM-IV (Mezzich et al., 1999), reflecting the acceptance of the cross-cultural psychiatry approach in the mainstream psychiatry (Kleinman and other influential cross-cultural
psychiatrists were involved in the DSM-IV task force). Popular diagnostic scales such as the MMPI and MMPI-2 have been carefully translated and validated in many languages (e.g., 32 versions of the MMPI-2 were published by 1996, Butcher, 1996), and used extensively in numerous nations in diverse settings ranging from clinics to military screening. Most important, research using the MMPI-2 has found many cross-cultural similarities in the profile types of various psychiatric patients (see Butcher, 2004 for review). In addition, large-scale cross-national epidemiological studies using the standardized diagnostic criteria have provided important information regarding similarities as well as differences across cultures in various psychopathologies (e.g., Jablensky et al., 1992). For instance, according to the study among Canadians, Iranians, Japanese, and Swiss conducted by the World Health Organization (1983), more than 76% of depressed patients in these nations reported a common pattern of depressive symptoms such as sadness, absence of joy, reduced concentration, and lack of energy. However, Draguns and Tanaka-Matsumi (2003) point out other findings that guilt feelings are major symptoms of depression among North Americans, whereas guilt is not a common symptom of depression in Japan, China, India, Indonesia, and Africa.

Even when there are a great deal of commonalities in symptoms of a particular psychiatric category across cultures, the likelihood of this particular category being used in a diagnosis can vary across cultures. For example, Weisz and colleagues (1995) showed that Thai teachers identified more externalizing problems in Thai children than did American teachers, even though objective raters identified more externalizing problems among American students than Thai. In other words, Thai teachers had a lower threshold for recognizing externalizing behaviors than American teachers, presumably because Thai students are on average more well-behaved than American students. These findings demonstrate the existence of the reference group effect in culture and psychopathology research (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). This is a significant issue in cross-cultural psychopathology research because the cultural
difference in teacher’s perception of students’ behaviors will likely to lead to the cultural
difference in the number of students referred to mental health service, and finally the prevalence
rate of a particular psychopathology. Furthermore, the similar cultural difference must exist
among mental health professionals’ perception of patients’ behaviors as well as patients’ self-
evaluation, which directly affects the prevalence data across cultures. Indeed, Mexican-born
Mexican Americans reported substantially lower prevalence rate of various psychological
disorders than U.S-born Mexican Americans (Burnam et al., 1987). Interestingly, Mexico-born
Mexican Americans’ prevalence rate was comparable to Mexicans living in Mexico city (Vegas
et al., 1998), solidifying the idea that culture plays a role in the conception of psychopathologies
and labeling of psychiatric categories. Thus, the prevalence data across cultures should be
interpreted with these issues in mind.

Although the aforementioned studies in this section emphasized cultural differences in
psychopathology, behavioral genetic research has shown that many psychopathologies are
heritable, ranging from the heritability coefficient of .80 for schizophrenia, .50-.60 for
alcoholism, .40-.50 for antisocial behavior, .40 for depression, to .30 for generalized anxiety
disorder (Bouchard, 2004). There is no question that various psychopathologies are affected by
genes. However, genes do not seem to work in a simple deterministic manner. Rather, the link
between the genes to observable behaviors is by no mean direct, because environmental
stimulations influence the likelihood that genes get activated (Marcus, 2004). To put these two
lines of research together, then, psychopathologies clearly have biological foundations that are
likely to be common among human species. At the same time, however, situational antecedents
(e.g., onset episodes) and the behavioral and affective manifestations of psychopathologies are
likely to vary, depending on local, cultural, and historical contexts (e.g., hysteria in Freud’s
Victorian Austria, anorexia on college campus in the U.S. in the 1990s and 2000s). In the end,
epidemiological and behavioral genetics research on psychopathology should be supplemented
by cultural psychological “thick” description of these circumstantial and phenomenological aspects of psychopathology.

9. Within-Culture Changes in Personality

As Victorian-era hysteria and modern day anorexia on American college campuses indicate, the prevalence of a particular psychopathology changes over time, sometimes drastically, within the same culture. Given that genetic pools have not changed quickly within any given society, these changes must be instigated by socio-cultural changes. One of the most exciting developments in culture and personality research, in our opinion, is the quantitative analysis of within-culture change in personality. Recent research on within-culture change in personality is similar to McClelland (1961) in spirit but different in terms of methodologies. Based on the longitudinal data from the Mills study, Roberts and Helson (1997), for instance, found that female participants became increasingly higher on self-focus and lower on norm adherence from 1958 to 1989, during which the American society is believed to have become more individualistic. This finding could be explained by personality maturation processes from age 20 to age 50. However, using a cross-temporal meta-analysis, Twenge and Campbell (2001) found that scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale increased steadily from 1968 to 1994 in the U.S, despite the steady decline in test scores, rise in divorce, and crime rate during this period. Twenge and Campbell’s data indicate that self-esteem of college students in the 1990s was higher than the self-esteem of college students in the 1960s. Thus, the maturation explanation does not apply to Twenge and Campbell’s results. Together, then, these findings suggest that Americans on average became more self-focused and to have higher self-esteem between the 1960’s and 1990’s. Similarly, Twenge (2001a) found that American college students’ scores on extraversion increased over time between 1966 and 1993. Twenge (2001b) also found that American women reported being more assertive and dominant from 1931 to 1945, then less assertive and dominant from 1946 to 1967, then again more assertive and dominant from 1968 to
1993. It is interesting to note that while self-esteem, extraversion, and assertiveness increased from the 1960’s to 1990’s, Americans’ anxiety scores also increased during the same period of time. Although it is difficult to discern whether within-cultural changes in these personality scores reflect behavioral changes or changes in judgment criteria, these findings seem to capture an American cultural change toward greater individualism (self-focus, self-initiated social interaction) and competition (and anxiety associated with it). The studies reviewed in this section, along with WVS data (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), present a promising future direction for culture and personality research that explores the important issue of cultural change and persistence.

10. New Developments and Future Directions

The future of cultural personality studies is exciting. Personality researchers in interested in how cultural factors influence personality-relevant processes and structures can profit from some new promising theoretical and methodological developments in the field, such as the integration of cultural and evolutionary approaches (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Rozin, 2003), the application of brain imaging techniques to the understanding of cultural phenomenon such as race and identity (Eberhardt, 2005), and the growing interest in the psychology of globalization and multiculturalism (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). For instance, some evolutionary theory-informed cultural researchers have proposed that many cross-cultural differences are in fact manifestations of deeper (universal and evolutionary adaptive) psychological similarities in motivation and cognition (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Recent brain imaging studies show that individuals’ pre-existing social representations of race deeply affect their visual perception and neural processing of human faces and every day objects (Eberhardt, 2005).

The need for both cultural and cross-cultural psychology to respond to the theoretical and methodological questions posed by the growing phenomenon of multiculturalism cannot be overestimated. In their sampling and design choices, cultural researchers have often assumed
that culture is a stable, uniform influence, and that nations and individuals are culturally homogeneous. But rapid globalization, continued massive migration, and the resulting demographic changes have resulted in social spaces (schools, homes, work settings) that are culturally diverse, and in the growing number of individuals who identify with, and live in more than one culture (Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Hong et al., 2000). Current and future cultural studies need to move beyond traditional between-group cultural comparisons and develop theoretical models and methodologies that capture the multiplicity and malleability of cultural meaning within individuals. Some recent studies have taken this approach in examining the interplay between personality dispositions and psychosocial processes such as acculturation (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000), multicultural attitudes (Van der Zee & Van Oudenhoven, 2001), bicultural identity structure (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005), and bilingualism (Ramirez-Esparza et al., 2006).

Finally, although many studies have established that cultural forces influence the expression of personality (i.e., culture→personality effects), almost no attention has been given to the processes by which personality may in turn influence culture (personality→culture effects). Evidence from recent studies shows that our personalities shape the cultural contexts in which we live by influencing both micro- (e.g., personal spaces, music preferences, content and style of personal web pages, etc.; Gosling et al., 2002; Rentfrow & Gosling, 2003; Vazire & Gosling, 2004) and macro- (e.g., political orientation, social activism, etc.; Jost et al., 2003) cultural elements. Thus, future cultural work in personality may benefit from using designs where researchers also explore personality effects on culture.

11. Conclusion

The history of cultural research in personality reminds us of a story of an athletic star. It appeared in an academic scene out of “nowhere,” and in a short period of time became the queen of the social and behavioral sciences. Like so many athletic stars, the enormous potentials of
cultural personality research were never fulfilled by a series of unfortunate events. Unlike athletic stars whose careers were cut short, however, the intellectual field of culture and personality has survived several *injuries*, and has again today become an important part of personality research. As shown above, the contribution of culture and personality research is substantial, ranging from elucidating links between individual and ecological influences on personality, dispelling cultural stereotypes and national characters, to testing theory generalizability. Furthermore, cultural personality studies bring about tangible societal benefits by offering scientists, managers, policy-makers, and the public ways to understand, manage, and benefit from the omnipresent cultural diversity that characterizes our society (Fowers & Richardson, 1996).

Now again the excitement for research on culture and personality is palpable. The grand ambition of early culture and personality researchers (e.g., Kluckhohn & Murray, 1948) can be realized with more measurement precision and more sophisticated data analytic techniques than ever before. In a way, culture and personality research has finally begun to fulfill the century old promise, and to cultivate new and exciting horizons beyond the traditional research agendas.
References


Endnotes

1 The terms “cross-cultural psychology” and “cultural psychology” refer to two different research traditions with somewhat distinct theoretical approaches, goals, and methodologies (see page X for a discussion of these issues). However, for the sake of simplicity, throughout the chapter we will often use the broader term ‘cultural’ (e.g., cultural research, cultural studies) to refer to both kinds of traditions and their theories and methodologies.

2 Interestingly, as pointed out by LeVine (2001), several psychological studies of the relationship between personhood and society done at that time (e.g., Allport, 1961; Kluckhohn & Murray, 1948; McClelland, 1961), were in fact quite rigorous and sophisticated in their conceptualizations of both culture and personality.